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Abstract: Poor families who became fire victims in North Jersey
between 1987 and 1991 generally found housing quickly, but had to
pay a lot more rent. However, a substantial number could not be
located after the fire, and so the conclusion must be modified
because some may have gone on welfare, left the area, or become
homeless. This finding is consistent with the notion that some classes
of low quality housing were disappearing in the late 1980's.
What happens to poor households who are burned out of their
homes? Is their grip on housing so tenuous that they are likely to
suffer long periods of homelessness? Or are they resilient enough to
bounce back quickly from even such a serious disaster? What
characteristics make for resilience? Do fires have long-lasting
effects, or do fire victims eventually resume the same sort of lives
they were leading before the fire?
In this paper, I will use a data set generated from the records
of the Essex County, New Jersey Chapter of the American Red Cross to
try to answer these questions. In the hours after a fire, the Essex
Red Cross helps fire victims with their immediate needs: replacing
medicines and glasses, getting warm clothing, and finding friends or
relatives for them to stay with. When all else fails, the Red Cross will
place fire victims in motels for up to a week. Later, when the
households have secured new housing, the Red Cross will help buy
new furniture and furnishings, and will pay the first month's rent.
Thus fire victims have strong incentives to let the Red Cross know
when and where they have found new housing, and how much it
costs. Since local welfare agencies provide similar services to their
clients and insurance companies for their customers, the Red Cross
does not provide these services for people who are receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or General Assistance (GA),
or people covered by disaster insurance, although it sees many such
people at fires.
The data cover the years 1987 through 1991. The largest
number of fires occurred in Newark, but the neighboring
municipalities of East Orange, Irvington, and Orange are also well
represented. For most of this period, the Essex County chapter also
handled Passaic County, and a substantial number of fires in the
cities of Paterson and Passaic are included.
While fires are important in themselves (residential fires
caused 4660 civilian deaths, 20,440 civilian injuries, and $3.7 billion
worth of property damage in 1987 [NFPA]), the Red Cross data can
also help in understanding several other issues. In the study of
homelessness, one recurring theme has been that the homeless are
simply ordinary poor people who have had a bad break. The study
of fire victims lets us test this notion by looking at what happens to
poor people who have had one kind of very bad break. Newark had
one of the highest rates of homelessness in the U.S. during the time
covered by these data.
We can also gain some insight from these data into the
workings of low-income housing markets. When buildings are
destroyed through fire (and generally not rebuilt), where do their
inhabitants go? Are there reasonably similar substitutes for the
buildings that are disappearing, or is there a systematic process
going on that destroys a whole class of buildings? The answers to
these questions are, of course, also relevant to the study of
homelessness.
The main findings are:
1. Fire victims we know about usually find new housing rather
quickly, in a matter of a few weeks.
2. However, a large proportion never return to the Red Cross
after the fire, despite substantial incentives to do so. I don't know
what happens to these households. Three explanations are consistent
with the data: they might go on welfare, they might move out of the
area, or they might become homeless.
3. Moving is common, and the predominant pattern of
movement is away from the center of Newark.
4. People who find housing pay large increases in rent, on the
order of magnitude of 25%. The best explanation for this increase is
that certain low qualities of housing were disappearing from the
market.
5. All the major municipalities had rent control ordinances on
the books during the period studied, but post-fire rents were almost
certainly unaffected by controls. A reasonable case can also be made
that rent controls were not binding for pre-fire rents either.
The plan of the paper is the following: the next section gives a
general description of the households in the data set. Section three
examines the issue of nonreturn. Section four is about the length of
time it takes to find new housing, and section five is about the
changes in rent that accompany a move to new housing. Section six
is about rent control, and section seven concludes.
2. THE SAMPLE
The sample consists of all 1768 households that the Essex Red
Cross disaster relief teams saw between the beginning of 1987 and
the middle of 1991. As Table 1 shows, the fires were spread fairly
evenly across the years, but within years were concentrated mainly
in the winter months. This is consistent with the pattern of
residential fires in the Essex County area. To preserve
confidentiality, personal identifying information was not recorded;
hence I cannot tell whether any household had two fires or whether
all 1768 households are in fact distinct.
The municipalities the households were living in at the time of
the fire are recorded in Table 2. Most fires occurred in Newark, but
East Orange, Orange, Irvington, Paterson, and Passaic all have sizable
numbers. Within Newark, the largest number of fires are in the
central portion—zip codes 07103 and 07108—but the northern and
southern areas of the city also had many fires.
Most fires were fairly severe, as Table 3 shows. In 1% of the
households, someone was killed in the fire; in 2% of households,
someone was hospitalized.
Few households were well off. Only 73 households had some
form of property or disaster insurance, and 255 households said they
were on welfare. Almost 10% of the households—generally single
person households—were living in rooming houses or SRO's when the
fire occurred. Table 4 shows that median reported income was less
than $10,000, and only one percent of households had incomes above
$25,000. 53% of households were female-headed.
Almost all the households were renters; only a handful (4.5%)
owned the properties they were living in at the time of the fire.
Average rent for households that rented on a monthly basis was
$398 before the fires; average weekly rent in rooming houses and
SRO's was $86.
Only about half of the households came back to collect the first
month's rent for a new apartment. Table 5 shows that people who
stayed in a motel, single people, SRO residents, and unemployed
people are less likely than average to come back; employed people
and households with children are more likely then average. Lower
income households are less likely to come back than higher income
households. We will explore this issue subsequently.
Within the class of households who came back, several patterns
are evident. First is that rents generally increase by a very large
amount. The average rent increase was $129, well over a quarter of
the average original rent. Table 6 gives some detail about how this
increase occurred. It shows, first, that increases of over $100 are
across-the-board; only families in which someone was killed were
able to decrease their rents (this intuitive, albeit ghoulish finding
lends some credence to the data). Rent increases were greater for
households who moved outside their original zip codes, who had fires
in 1987, who went to a motel after the fire, who searched for more
than 35 days, and whose income was either below $6500 or between
$20,000 and $25,000.
Table 6 excludes families who were rehoused in public housing.
Although fire victims have some priority on public housing waiting
lists, only a handful—1.6% of those for whom new addresses are
known—moved to public housing. Mostly, these were elderly
families.
Table 7 shows the origins and destinations of moves between
the main Essex County municipalities. The pattern is fairly clear: the
chief net flow is from central Newark to nearby suburbs, especially
Irvington and outlying portions of Newark. Since original rents
tended to be higher in the areas gaining households than in the areas
losing them, the rent increases are linked in part to geographic
mobility.
Red Cross staff generally discouraged motel stays; they
believed that the stress of a fire was best recovered from in the
presence of family and friends. However, 44.4% of the households
stayed for some period in a motel or a shelter.
For those households for whom we have information, the time
it took to find new housing was quite short. On average, households
moved into new housing 28.0 days after they were burned out.
Households that stayed in motels took less time than average to find
new housing (23.6 days); so did single individuals (27.2 days).
Residents of SRO's and rooming houses found new housing very
quickly (16.4 days). Old people, on the other hand, took relatively
long (an average of 38.1 days for households headed by someone
over 60). Table 8 shows that households who had fires in 1987 took
longer to find new housing than did households who had fires later.
It also shows only one noticeable geographic difference: households
who started in East Orange found new housing more quickly than
other households. The poorest households took a little bit longer
than average to find new housing (31.2 days), but there is no other
apparent pattern by income class.
Similarly, Table 9 shows no apparent relationship between the
geographic distance moved and the time it took to make this move.
In this table, "LENGTH" is a crude measure of distance: LENGTH=0 for
a move within the same zip code; LENGTH=1 for a move to an
adjacent zip code; LENGTH=2 for a move to a zip code adjacent to an
adjacent zip code (but not adjacent to the original); and so on.
LENGTH=4 for the longest category of moves.
3. NONRETURN
These descriptive statistics indicate clearly that we have to
understand why households don't return in order to think about
what happens to those who do. Those who don't return, also, are
prime candidates for prolonged homelessness. Eligible households
have substantial incentives to return to the Red Cross when they find
new housing: several hundred dollars for the first month's rent, and
possibly several hundred more to help replace household
furnishings. Households that don't return look like they're "leaving
money on the table."
Why might households not return? I can think of several
reasons.
1. Eligibility. They might not be eligible, because of either
welfare or insurance. The data allow us to control for this possibility.
2. Fraud. Households on welfare might lie to the Red Cross,
claim not to be, receive immediate replacement items, and then
disappear, to be compensated once more by welfare agencies. If this
type of fraud were important, households that "looked like" welfare
families would be less likely to return.
3. Stigma. Receiving charity from the Red Cross might have
stigma attached to it.
4. Household reorganization. The household might dissolve, or
join another household more or less permanently, or its parts might
join other households more or less permanently. This scenario has
some plausibility because the original households were by no means
simple. For the 1711 households with complete enough data to be
used for regressions, the average number of the household head's
children over 22 who were present was 0.162, and the average
number of adults other than nuclear family members was 0.398
(note that the denominator includes one-person households). If
household changes are important in explaining nonreturn, smaller
households—because they can join others more easily—and
households who don't stay at motels—because they have more
contacts—will be less likely to return.
5. Welfare. Some households who were not on welfare when
the fire occurred might decide to go on welfare. The fire might push
them. If so, lower income households, unemployed households, and
single parent households would be less likely to return.
6. Moving. Households might move out of the area. No rule
precludes such households from returning, and places like Queens
appear among the post-fire addresses. Nevertheless, distance can be
a substantial disincentive. If moving were an important reason for
nonreturn, more footloose households would be less likely to return
—smaller households, unemployed households, households with so
few ties that they stayed in motels.
7. Homelessness. Households might become homeless, more or
less permanently. 49 cases were closed because the household had
no demonstrable income, and so the Red Cross could not reasonably
expect a landlord to rent them an apartment. If homelessness were
an important reason for nonreturn, very low income households and
households who stayed in motels (because they had worse support
networks) would be less likely to return.
To explore these possibilities, several regressions were run.
Table 10 reports the major results for binomial probit estimates; OLS
and multinomial logit estimates are similar. Fires in 1991 were
excluded because of censoring and data problems.
Table 10 shows that year of fire doesn't matter, but that
geography does: Passaic County fire victims are significantly more
likely to return that Essex County ones. I'm not sure what this
finding means; perhaps there are differences in quality of service or
clarity of instructions.
As expected, eligibility plays a major role. Both disaster
insurance and welfare have large and significant negative
coefficients. Records indicating ineligibility greatly reduce the
probability of return. One interesting difference here is between city
(General Assistance) and county (AFDC) welfare. City welfare
recipients seem to have a much greater probability of returning.
This result probably arises from the way households were
categorized by type of income. I did not use a partition; a household
was classified as receiving as many types of income as were
applicable. Since many households contained unrelated adults and
grown children, city welfare recipients could have been living in
households with people who had other sources of income. These
households would have been included among those receiving city
welfare, but they would have been eligible for Red Cross assistance.
Some county welfare recipients were doubled up, too, but since city
welfare recipients are usually single individuals while county
welfare recipients are usually families, such doubling up is probably
less common among county welfare recipients.
On the other hand, Table 10 does not support a fraud
explanation. Four variables were constructed to look for fraud. They
are:
PRWELFD1: Children under 18, female head, and not on
welfare.
PRWELFD2: Same as PRWELFD1, and income from employment.
PRWELFD 187: PRWELFD1, and fire in 1987.
PRWELFD 287: PRWELFD 2, and fire in 1987.
The idea behind these variables is to look for households who
might really have been receiving AFDC, but who lied to the Red Cross
in order to get some immediate assistance. The Red Cross tightened
procedures in 1988, and so this type of fraud, if it existed, might
have been more prevalent in 1987. If fraud is an important reason
for nonreturn, these variables should have significant negative
coefficients.
They don't. All of the coefficients are insignificant, and only
PRWELFD has even the right sign. And since only 4.5% of the sample
falls into the PRWELFD2 category, fraud does not seem to be an
important reason for nonreturn.
Nor do the data in Table 10 support a stigma explanation.
Households receiving other non-means-tested transfer payments-
social security, social security disability, veterans' benefits—are
neither more nor less likely to return than other similar households.
If some people thought non-means-tested transfer payments were
stigmatizing, these households would be less likely both to receive
these benefits and, contingent upon having had a fire, to return for
the first month's rent. Coefficients on receipt of social security,
disability, and veterans' benefits would then be positive. In Table
10, however, these coefficients are insignificant and, in two of three
cases, negative. Thus Table 10 does not support a stigma
interpretation.
This finding should not be surprising, as a stigma explanation is
inherently implausible. The take-up rate on Red Cross benefits is
low—under 60%—but the event that triggers benefits—a fire—is not
particularly stigmatizing (at least in New Jersey). Moreover, the
organization providing the assistance—the Red Cross—is associated in
the public mind with aid to military personnel (its original mission)
and disaster relief, neither of which seems to carry any stigma.
Many fire victims probably made contributions to the Red Cross and
the United Way. Receiving aid from the Red Cross seems no more
stigmatizing than having the fire engines arrive.
Some evidence in Table 10 supports a household reorganization
explanation, but it is weak and more decisive evidence points in the
opposite direction. Larger households are more likely to return, but
the household size coefficient is only of borderline significance.
Roominghouse and SRO residents are significantly less likely to
return, but other explanations also explain this phenomenon (since
most roominghouses and SRO's charge by the week, not the month,
the value of returning is less for this group, but column (3) of Table
10 shows that weekly rent explains little of the SRO effect).
The decisive evidence against a household reorganization
explanation is the negative and significant coefficient on motel stays.
Households who went to motels are the households who had the
weakest support network of family and friends. They are therefore
the least likely to be dissolved into that network and so, if household
reorganization were important, would have the highest probability of
returning. In fact, households who stayed in motels have a
significantly lower probability of returning, and so household
reorganization is not supported by the data.
We are left with three possible explanations for nonreturn,
none of which seems to be contradicted by the data: welfare, moving,
and homelessness. The significantly higher probability of nonreturn
for poor households—households with incomes below $10,000—
supports both the welfare and homelessness explanations. If welfare
eligibility is important, one might expect the PRWELFD dummy
variables to perform better, especially PRWELFD 1, since they
measure whether the household has the right configuration to
qualify for AFDC. However, households might reorganize to qualify,
and AFDC is not the only welfare program in New Jersey. The
negative coefficient on motel stays also supports all three
explanations.
So at this time a definitive answer to the question of what
causes nonreturn is impossible. Welfare, moving, and homelessness
are all possibilities, but I cannot distinguish among them.
4. TIME
Among those households who returned, we have already seen
that the length of time between the fire and the acquisition of new
housing (hereafter referred to as "time") was quite short. Average
time was under a month, and average times for almost all
identifiable subgroups were not much different.
Table 11 shows a similar pattern: nothing much seems to affect
time. The only significant coefficients are for income: households
with income below $6500 take a significantly longer time than
higher-income households. The equation in Table 11 was run with a
selectivity correction which turned out to be insignificant; results for
equations without a selectivity correction are similar.
Hazard rate models would probably do a better job of
describing how time was determined, but time is generally so short
that there does not seem to be much to be learned. In particular,
there doesn't seem to be any reason to think that the processes that
generate time for fire victims bear any resemblance to the processes
that generate duration of homelessness.
5. RENT CHANGE
The most notable thing that happens to fire victims in the Red
Cross data is that they pay more rent when they find new housing.
The descriptive statistics showed this increase to be large and
general.
Table 12 gives a more detailed look at the rent increase. The
dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the difference between
pre-fire rent and post-fire monthly rent. (Weekly rents were
multiplied by 4.3 to make a composite rent figure.) The dependent
variable in columns (3) and (4) is pre-fire rent.
Table 12 shows that the rent increase is greatest for
households with incomes between $6500 and $10,000, and least for
households with incomes below $6500, but there is no significant
difference in the increase between the poorest households and
households making over $20,000 a year (for households between
$10,000 and $20,000 the difference is also insignificant but it
approaches significance). Geography and year of fire don't matter,
but larger households have smaller rent increases. Coefficients on
the selectivity correction and time are also insignificant.
What are we to make of these findings? The insignificant,
almost zero coefficient on time is some indication that households are
fairly well informed about the housing market and search rationally.
Households who believe new rental opportunities are generated from
a stationary distribution will search until an opportunity beats a
threshold that is constant through time. The distribution of accepted
opportunities will be the same no matter how long the search has
taken. A Bayesian household that was not very well informed about
the rental market initially would usually not act as if it were drawing
from a stationary distribution; hence by "fairly well informed" I
mean well enough informed to act as if it were drawing from a
stationary distribution (a more careful econometric model would
jointly determine "change" and "time," but these questions are not
central to the paper).
The significant negative coefficient on household size also
deserves comment. One possible explanation is that households shed
peripheral members (cousins, uncles, friends) when they are forced
to move, and large households have more of these peripheral
members to shed. The Red Cross data show only the household size
when the fire occurred; they do not show the size of the household
that moved into new housing. Large households that got smaller
before they moved into new housing would mitigate the rent
increase they faced; this behavior could explain the negative
coefficient in Table 12.
To test for this possibility I ran the rent change equation again,
but included as explanatory variables NUMOTF, the number of
unrelated adult females and NUMOTM, the number of unrelated
adult males (see Table 12A). As expected, including these variables
made the coefficient on household size insignificant. However,
neither coefficient for unrelated adults is significant, and they have
opposite signs. Shedding unrelated adults seems to be some part of
the process that households undergo after a fire, but it is not the
whole story.
What sort of process is causing these increases in rent? I can
think of four possibilities.
One is that the Red Cross subsidy is driving the increase. Post-
fire rents are subsidized, and so households should buy more
housing. The Red Cross subsidy is only a small fraction, however, of
the expected present value of rent payments at the new apartment,
and the price elasticity of demand for housing is at most only slightly
greater than one. Subsidy can explain only a small fraction of the
rent increase, if rents are constant during the household's entire
post-fire occupancy.
Could landlords be charging a high first month's rent to bilk the
Red Cross, and then be reducing rent thereafter? I don't have any
direct evidence to rule this possibility out. Red Cross operations,
however, are not run by fools, and have incentives to reduce cost.
The second possibility is simply adjustment. Moving is costly,
and so households will keep their living arrangements the same for a
period of time even if those arrangements are no longer optimal. A
fire forces a move, and so allows a household to find new
arrangements that more closely match its current situations.
Some of the coefficients in Table 12 support an adjustment
story. The member-shedding explanation of the household size
coefficient can easily be rephrased as an adjustment story, for
instance. Column (3) seems to indicate that households in the $6500-
$10,000 income range seemed to be paying unusually low rent
initially, perhaps because their incomes had risen but their living
quarters had not improved; the unusually large rent increase in
column (1) would then be largely an adjustment. Similarly, but in
the reverse direction, unusually high initial rents for households in
the $20,000-$25,000 income range could explain the very small rent
increase for this group.
Adjustment by itself, however, seems incapable of explaining
why rent increases should be overwhelmingly positive. In the
absence of some underlying trend, just as many adjustments should
be negative as are positive. This brings us to a second possible
explanation: a shift upward in the quality-price schedule,
accompanied by a disappearance from the market of the lowest
qualities of housing. Fires would be one way for this housing to
disappear. In [1992], I give a series of reasons why such a change
would have occurred in the 1980's.
The large increases in rent paid by the $6500-$ 10,000 income
class is consistent with such a story; these may have been the people
forced to go to higher qualities of housing. Higher income groups
would not have been, and so their increases should have been much
more modest.
The pattern of coefficients on year of fire also supports this
interpretation. The significant positive coefficient on initial rents in
1990 is at first puzzling: why should the rents of occupied
apartments that burn go up in a recession? Oil was expensive in
early 1990, but real estate taxes and water and sewer fees did not go
up much in Newark until late 1990 and early 1991, and other
operating costs should have been helped by the moderation of
inflation. Nor did impending gentrification push up the opportunity
cost of operating low-income housing at this time.
The implicit zero coefficient on the default income class, 0-
$6500, however, raises a question for such an interpretation. Why
should the rent increase have been less for this group than for any
other? Since many single people were in this group, part of the
effect of being very poor may be being picked up by the household
size coefficient. In addition, consistent with Tables 5 and 10, very
few households in this class returned to the Red Cross and those who
did took a long time to find new housing (Tables 8 and 11). This is
consistent with a story in which housing for this class is disappearing
from the market, and except for a lucky few members who search
diligently, most households in this class reorganize or become
homeless after a fire.
The fourth possible explanation is that the rent increases are
due to rent control. We turn to this explanation in the next section.
6. RENT CONTROL
All of the major municipalities had rent control ordinances in
effect during the sample period, but the ordinances were different.
Table 13 summarizes the major differences among the ordinances.
One possible explanation for the rise in rents that households
experienced after fires is that rent control was holding their pre-fire
rents below market (this would have contributed to the propensity
to have a fire). The rise is merely a measure of the difference
between controlled rent and market rent.
For this story to be plausible, two conditions must be met: rent
control must be both effective and binding for the buildings that had
fires, and it must not be binding for the buildings to which the fire
victims moved.
It is easier to establish the latter proposition than the former.
Several pieces of evidence indicate that the new apartments were
not bindingly rent controlled. Table 13 indicates that several major
municipalities had vacancy decontrol: Irvington, Orange, Passaic, and,
until May 1988, East Orange. Newark's formal decontrol provisions
are rather onerous, but de facto control exists for most of Newark's
rental housing stock. This is because of the 30,000 to 40,000 units
that rent control supposedly governs in Newark, only about 10,000
to 15,000 are registered with the rent control office, and the city has
never tried to enforce the registration ordinance. Without
registration, a prospective new tenant has no way to find out what
the previous rent was, and no incentive to do anything but come to a
mutually satisfactory agreement with the landlord.
Table 13 also shows that except for Paterson, most
municipalities have significant portions of their rental stock exempt
even from de jure rent control. The figures in Figure 13 understate
the proportion of the private rental stock covered by rent control
because the denominator includes public and semi-public housing
where rents are governed by HUD guidelines. In Newark, for
instance, public housing accounts for about 10% of the occupied
rental stock and just one nonprofit developer, New Community
Corporation, for another 3%.
Several findings elsewhere in this paper indicate that post-fire
rents were not constrained by rent control. The time it took to find a
new apartment was so short that rationing could not have been
severe; similarly the tiny and insignificant coefficient on time in the
rent change equation argues against any queueing phenomenon.
More direct evidence comes from Table 14.
In Table 14, destination dummies were added to the rent
change equation. They are uniformly insignificant, despite the
considerable differences in rent control among municipalities.
Destination dummies are of course collinear with origin dummies, but
neither set alone is significant either.
Table 15 shows in another way that rent control seems to have
no effect on the post-fire market. The municipality dummies in
Table 14 pick up all sorts of geographic and public services
differences among municipalities, not just differences in rent control.
Table 15 holds many of these differences constant by looking at a
single municipality, East Orange. In 1984, East Orange adopted a
decontrol ordinance, but it effectively reversed itself in May 1988
when it limited decontrol to apartments in such precise and excellent
physical condition that they would not be serious possibilities for
most of the households in this data set.
If rent control raised the price of new apartments above the
market level in East Orange, then decontrol should have made it
easier to find new apartments in East Orange. The de jure end of
decontrol would make it less likely that burned out households
would move to (or stay in) East Orange. Accordingly, Table 15 shows
binomial probit estimates of the probability of finding a new
apartment in East Orange. If rent control is binding and de jure
decontrol matters, then the coefficients for the period after May
1988 will be smaller than the coefficients before. This is not the
case. The probability of finding a new apartment in East Orange is
greater in 1989 than in 1987, and no differences are significant.
Either rent control was not binding in East Orange, or East Orange
after May 1988 resembled Newark in having de facto decontrol.
The question of whether rent control was binding for pre-fire
rents is more difficult to assess. That rent control was not binding
for post-fire apartments might create a presumption that it was not
binding for pre-fire ones either, but the same sort of arguments
cannot be carried over. We don't know if households queued for
their pre-fire apartments, and the lack of registration does not imply
that rent control is ineffective for continuing tenants: fear of
impelling an aggrieved tenant to complain to the city may induce a
landlord to moderate rent increases, even if the building was not
registered.
On the other hand, except in Passaic there is no reason de jure
why an apartment in any of these municipalities should not be
paying market rent. That's because all of them except Passaic allow
hardship rent increases where mortgage payments are considered
part of expenses. Theoretically, a landlord whose rents are below
market need only sell his property to receive the present value of
market rents.
Fear, ignorance, and uncertainty about dealing with the city
mean that actual practice can differ from this theory. The same
forces splitting de facto from de jure, on the other hand, also
constrain tenants in unregistered buildings from protesting rent
increases. Simply looking at rent control laws is not going to tell
whether they are effective.
Substantial (though hardly definitive) circumstantial evidence
indicates that they were not, for this group of apartments. During
the 80's, rent that poor people were paying rose substantially (see,
e.g., Blank and Rosen [1989]). There is no reason to believe that
Newark was immune from this trend. Yet irate tenants impelled no
great influx of registrations; if anything, registration has become
more haphazard.
Remember also that the pre-fire apartments are apartments
that burned. Fires are events, often random, in a sequence of
disrepair and nonmaintenance that drives down a building's quality.
Rent control may or may not affect a landlord's decision to reduce
quality, but reducing quality is a highly effective way of evading
even strictly enforced rent control laws. Tenants in deteriorating
buildings pay the market price for the actual quality of housing they
are purchasing. That a building burned creates a presumption that
rent control was not binding.
7. CONCLUSION
Fire victims in North Jersey generally found new housing
quickly, but they had to pay much higher rents when they got it.
The people whom the Red Cross saw generally seem not to have
become homeless; even though they were poor, most poor people
seem to be able to bounce back from even very bad breaks without
falling into homelessness. Nevertheless, this group's experiences
show the kind of upheaval in the housing market that could easily
lead to increased homelessness.
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Geographic Distribution of Fires
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Proportion Returning to Red Cross after Fire
TOTAL: 49.3%
If household contains children under 18 52.8
If single person 38.6
If covered by insurance 10.9
If head of household is 60 or older 47.2




















If staying in same zip code 108.06
If changing zip code 139.24
If single 107.69
If children under 18 135.25
If motel or shelter after fire 139.68
If someone was killed -114.00
If search was more than 35 days 146.15
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Average Time between Fire and New Housing
All households:






































Average Time Between Fire and New Housing
By Length of Move
















































































































































































































































DRSRO = resident of roominghouse or SRO before fire
Motel = stayed in a motel after the fire









































































F = 1.131 N = 728
Gamma = selectivity correction




















































































































































Yes, to May '88
Partial after May
1974
5% if <49 units



















































































All municipalities exempt hotels and motels. The following
exempt licensed roominghouses: Paterson, Passaic after September
1987, East Orange.
Before April 1988, Passaic exempted units that rented for less
than $55 per room if the landlord supplied heat, $45 per room if the
landlord did not supply heat. After April 1988, the exemption was
raised to $75 per room with heat and $60 without.
Vacancy Decontrol:
Newark allows rent increases of up to 25% on vacant
apartments if the landlord spends at least $100 per room for
rehabilitation while they are vacant.
After May 1988, East Orange permits vacancy decontrol only if
a two-page list of demanding physical conditions (e.g., four electrical
outlets in the kitchen) is met. In addition, a unit may be
decontrolled only once in its lifetime.
Annual Increases:
Passaic annual adjustments are based on the New York-North
Jersey CPI for Urban Workers, but were limited to $20 per month
before April 1988, $25 per month after.
Before April 1986, Newark allowed 6% increases.
Hardship Increases:
In all municipalities but East Orange and Passaic, landlords can,
with rent control board approval, raise rents to get a fair rate of
return equity. "Mortgage?" indicates that mortgage payments are
considered an expense for this calculation. In Passaic, hardship
increases are designed to assure that operating expenses do not
exceed 65% of the rent roll. East Orange gives its board discretion to
consider both whether the landlord is getting a fair rate of return on
equity, and whether operating expenses exceed 60% of the rent roll.
Size Exemption as % of Rental Stock:
Estimates are based on the 1990 census of housing. The class
"structures with 3 or 4 units" was assumed to be divided evenly
between structures with 3 units and structures with 4 units. Only
exemptions based on size were considered. Source: Table 58, General
Housing Characteristics: New Jersey, Ch-1-32, July 1992.
Table 14













































































Probability of Moving to East Orange
Binomial Probit Estimates
Constant
Income class:
$6500-10,000
$10,000-15,000
$15,000-20,000
$20,000-25,000
Over $25,000
Location of fire:
Newark
East Orange
Irvington
Paterson, Passaic
Household number
Pre-fire rent
Year of fire:
1988
1989
1990
Log-likelihood
Chi-squared
coefficient
-1.199
0.217
0.145
0.291
0.231
0.738
-0.531
1.124
-4.129
-4.171
-0.070
0.001
-.0603
0.122
-0.210
-79
9 1 .
t-ratio
-2.278
0.595
0.429
0.867
0.430
0.680
-1.485
3.210
-0.056
-0.091
-1.077
1.131
-1.243
0.404
-0.698
.816
239
N 282
